Merleau-Ponty

This is the reading list and assessment questions for my module on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.

Core texts

  • Merleau-Ponty, M. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge. [There is a newer translation by Don Landes, which is very good. The link is to Colin Smith’s earlier translation, but you should feel free to read Landes’ version instead.]
  • Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2010. Routledge GuideBook to Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception. London: Routledge.

Husserl

  • Bell, D. 1990. Husserl. London: Routledge. [Particularly sections on Fifth Meditation and the Crisis.]
  • Moran, D. 2000. Introduction to Phenomenology. London: Routledge. [Particularly section on Husserl.]
  • Smith, D. W., McIntyre, R. 1982. Husserl and Intentionality: A Study of Mind, Meaning, and Language. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Co. [Particularly chapter III, section 1.2.]

Introduction to Merleau-Ponty’s work

  • Routledge GuideBook, chapter 1
  • Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge. [Chapter 1.]
  • Carman, T. 2009. Merleau-Ponty and the mystery of perception. Philosophy Compass 4 (4), pp. 630-8.
  • Heinämaa, S. 2013. Merleau-Ponty: a phenomenological philosophy of mind and body. In A. Bailey (ed.) Key Thinkers in the Philosophy of Mind. London: Continuum
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 1].
  • Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2011. Merleau-Ponty. In S. Luft and S. Overgaard (eds.) Routledge Companion to Phenomenology. London: Routledge, pp. 103-12.

Merleau-Ponty’s Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction

Traditional Prejudices

  • Phenomenology of Perception, INTRODUCTION Traditional prejudices and the return to phenomena.
  • Routledge GuideBook, chapter 2.
  • Carman, T. 2005. Sensation, judgement, and the phenomenal field. In T. Carman and M. Hansen (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 50—73.
  • Hammond, M., Howarth, J., Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwells. [Section ‘The critique of Objective Thought’.]
  • Köhler, W. 1971. On unnoticed sensations and errors of judgement. In M. Henle (ed.) The Selected Papers of Wolfgang Köhler. New York: Liverwright, pp. 13-39.
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 2].

The Body

  • Phenomenology of Perception, PART I The body, sections 1-4.
  • Routledge GuideBook, chapter 3.
  • Annas, J. 2012. Practical expertise. In J. Bengson and M. A. Moffett (eds.) Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford: OUP, pp. 101—112.

  • Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge. [Chapters 2 and 3.]
  • Dreyfus, H. A Merleau-Pontyian critique of Husserl’s and Searle’s representationalist accounts of action. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (3), pp. 287-302.
  • Dreyfus, H., Wakefield, J. 1991. Intentionality and the phenomenology of action. In E. Lepore and R. Van Gulick (eds.) 1991. John Searle and his Critics. Oxford: Blackwells, pp. 259-70.
  • Dreyfus H., Dreyfus S. 1999. The challenge of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Embodiment for Cognitive Science. In G. Weiss and H. F. Haber (eds.) Perspectives on Embodiment: The Intersections of Nature and Culture. New York: Routledge, pp. 103-20.
  • Hammond, M., Howarth, J., Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwells. [Section ‘The body as subject’.]
  • Kelly, S. 2002. Merleau-Ponty on the body. Ratio 15 (4), pp. 376—91.
  • Kelly, S. 2005. Seeing things in Merleau-Ponty. In T. Carman and M. B. Hansen (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74—110.
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 3].
  • Noë, A. 2005. Against intellectualism. Analysis, 64 pp. 278—90.
  • Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2007. Merleau-Ponty and the power to reckon with the possible. In T. Baldwin (ed.) Reading Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, pp. 44-58.
  • Young, I. 2005. Throwing like a girl. In her On Female Body Experience – ‘Throwing Like a Girl’ and Other Essays. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 27—45.

Worries about the Schneider case

The Mind

  • Phenomenology of Perception, Part I The body, sections 1-4, and 6. Part III Being-for-itself and being-in-the-world, section 1.
  • Routledge GuideBook, chapters 6 and 7.
  • Cataldi, S. L. 2008. Affect and sensibility. In R. Diprose and J. Reynolds (eds.) Merleau-Ponty: Key Concepts. Durham: Acumen, pp. 163-73.
  • Clark, A., Chalmers, D. 1998. The extended mind. Analysis 58, pp. 10—23.
  • Moran, R. 2001. Authority and Estrangement. Chapters 1, 2, and 3.
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 3].
  • Rietveld, E. 2008. Situated normativity: the normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action. Mind 117 (468), pp. 973—1001.

Motor intentionality
The readings on the body and the mind will also be useful here (and vice versa).

The World

  • Phenomenology of Perception, Part II The world as perceived, sections 1-3.
  • Routledge GuideBook, chapter 4.
  • Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, ch. 3
  • Hammond, M., Howarth, J., Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwells. [Section ‘The perception of objects’.]
  • Kelly, S. 2005. Seeing things in Merleau-Ponty. In T. Carman and M. B. Hansen (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 74—110.
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 4].
  • Romdenh-Romluc, K. 2009. Merleau-Ponty’s account of hallucination. European Journal of Philosophy 17, pp. 76—90.

Other Selves

  • Phenomenology of Perception, Part II The world as perceived, section 4.
  • Routledge GuideBook, chapter 5.
  • Carman, T. 2008. Merleau-Ponty. London: Routledge, ch. 4
  • Hammond, M., Howarth, J., Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwells, ‘The recognition of other selves’.
  • McGinn, M. 1998. The real problem of others: Cavell, Merleau-Ponty and Wittgenstein on scepticism about other minds. European Journal of Philosophy, 6, pp. 45—58
  • Morris, K. 2012. Starting with Merleau-Ponty. London: Continuum. [Chapter 5].

Freedom

  • Phenomenology of Perception, Part III Being-for-itself and being-in-itself, section 3.
  • Compton, J. 1982. Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and human freedom. The Journal of Philosophy, 10 pp. 577—88.
  • Hammond, M., Howarth, J., Keat, R. 1991. Understanding Phenomenology. Oxford: Blackwells, ‘Freedom and its limits’.
  • Wrathall, M. 2005. Reasons, motives and causes. In T. Carman and M. Hansen (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Merleau-Ponty. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 111—28.

Temporality

Merleau-Ponty on sexuality

  • Butler, Judith. 1989. Sexual ideology and phenomenological description: a feminist critique of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception. In Jeffner Allen and Iris Marion Young (eds.) The Thinking Muse: Feminism and Modern French Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 85-100.
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